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Born from the marriage of nanotechnology and medicine, nanomedicine is set to bring advantages in the fight against unmet
diseases. The field is recognized as a global challenge, and countless worldwide research and business initiatives are in place to
obtain a significant market position. However, nanomedicine belongs to those emerging sectors in which business development
methods have not been established yet. Open issues include which type of business model best fits these companies and which
strategies would lead them to sustained growth. This paper describes the financial and strategic decisions by nanomedicine
start-ups to reach the market successfully, obtain a satisfactory market share, and build and maintain a competitive defendable
advantage. Walking nanomedicine-product from the hands of the inventor to those of the doctor, we explored the technological
transfer process, which connects laboratories or research institutions to the marketplace. The process involves detailed analysis to
evaluate the potentials of end-products, and researches to identify market segment, size, structure, and competitors, to ponder
a possible market entry and the market share that managers can realistically achieve at different time horizons. Attracting funds
is crucial but challenging. However, investors are starting to visualize the potentials of this field, magnetized by the business of
“nano.”
1. Introduction
Globally defined as the application of nanotechnology to the
clinical arena, nanomedicine has its roots in the same basic
concepts and principles of nanotechnology; that is, mate-
rials with the nanoscale features present unique character-
istics, otherwise absent at a macroscopic level [1]. Just as
nanotechnology benefits frommathematics and engineering,
nanomedicine too has a multidisciplinary nature involving
notions and techniques borrowed from biology, chemistry,
and physics [2]. As a result of this successful marriage, nanos-
tructure materials display emerging functions that have
exceptional benefits when applied to medical devices.
The success of nanotechnology in the healthcare sector is
driven by the possibility to work at the same scale of several
biological processes, cellular mechanisms, and organic
molecules; for this reason, medicine has looked at nan-
otechnology as the ideal solution for the detection and
treatment of many diseases. One of the many applications of
nanotechnology to the medical sector is in the field of drug
delivery. The advent of protocols and methods for the syn-
thesis, functionalization, and use of nanoparticles and nano-
carriers has flooded the scientific and clinic community with
new therapeutic approaches from molecular targeting to
radiofrequency ablation and from personalized therapies to
minimally invasive techniques.
While most members of the investment community
are able to grasp the meaning of nanotechnology and can
expertly launch andmanage a viable product into themarket,
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they are limited in their conceptual understanding of this
scientific discipline and the intricate inner workings behind
the product’s functionality [3]. On the contrary, those
involved in the scientific research recognize that nano-
medicine is an expansion of nanotechnology but have very
little understanding of the business expertise required to
develop their technologies into a commercial product [3].
Cooperation is therefore needed between the two factions in
order to lead nanomedicine-based inventions to a successful
market position.
2. Nanomedicine Market
With 76% [4] of the publications and 59% [4] of the
patents, drug delivery is the market segment that dominates
the nanomedicine sector. In vitro diagnostics represent the
second leading field, contributing with 11% [4] of the
publications and 14% [4] of the patent filings. According to
the European Commission [4] in a global vision, clustering
the publications in the three geographical areas USA, Europe,
and Asia (Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and
India), Europe is leading with 36% [4] of the worldwide pub-
lications, followed by the USA with 32% [4] and Asia with
18% [4]. Considering all patent applications in the different
fields of nanomedicine, USA hold a share of 53% [4], Europe
has 25% [4], and Asia 12% [4]. Biopharmaceutical and
medical devices companies are well aware of the potential
applications of nanotechnology to the healthcare sector,
as demonstrated by the increasingly growing partnerships
between these enterprises and nanomedicine startups.
According to a research report from the Business Com-
munications Company (BCC) Research, despite the catas-
trophic consequences of the 2008-2009 crisis on capital mar-
kets, the global nanomedicine sector, which was worth $53
[5] billion in 2009, is projected to grow at a compound
annual growth rate (CAGR) of 13.5%, surpassing $100 bil-
lion in 2014 (see Figure 1(a)) [5]. One of the largest segments
of this market is represented by anticancer products. Valued
about $20 billion [5] in 2009, it is expected to reach $33
billion [5] in 2014, growing at a CAGR of 11% [5] (see
Figure 1(b)).
3. Financing of Nanomedicine
3.1. Common Issues in the Investments on Innovation. The
primary output of innovation is obtaining the know-how,
which the inventor initially possesses. Unfortunately, the
confidentiality of this knowledge can be breached and its
use by one company cannot preclude the use of the same by
another one. Therefore, investors approaching novel projects
are aware of the fact that they will not be able to easily
appropriate the total returns of the investment undertaken.
As a consequence, there is a lack of attractiveness in financing
innovative projects. In fact, from the perspective of economic
theory, it is complex to find funding for innovative ideas in
a competitive market place [6]. Even in large firms, there is
evidence of shortages in resources to spend on the innovative
projects that the managers would like to undertake [6].
There are a number of reasons for this phenomenon: low
expected returns due to an incapacity to capture the profits
from an invention, the exaggerated optimism in undertaking
an investment on breakthrough projects, and most notably
the uncertainty and risk associated with these projects.
Technology-based companies can also consider imitating
the inventions developed by competitors. However, Edwin
et al. [7], using survey evidence, found that imitating is
not costless and could result in expenses equal to 50%
[7] to 75% [7] of the cost of the original invention, not
eliminating the underinvestment problem. Policymakers are
trying to change the funding situation, by facilitating the
invention process, rationalizing the interventions through
government encouragement of innovative activities, sus-
taining the intellectual property system, allowing Research
and Development tax incentives, and supporting research
collaborations. Nonetheless, the path that leads the nanoscale
outcome from the laboratory to the marketplace is long and
expensive, putting the inventor in a position of disadvantage.
3.2. Asymmetric Information, Credibility, and Commitment.
The financing and management of innovative products in
nanomedicine—like many young and innovative multi-
sectoral fields—happens in a context of both financial and
product markets failures. These make the financing and
management of innovation a particularly complex process,
which is also reflected in the corporate governance structure
of innovative firms.
Asymmetric information, transaction costs, intangible
goods, credibility, and commitment issues, jointly with high
and unique risks, make it impossible for traditional financial
institutions to be part of the picture, paving the way for angel
investors, seed and venture capital investors, or other forms
of nontraditional financial institutions.
The asymmetric information issue is partly due to the
different information set in the hands of the innovator as
opposed to that of the possible provider of funds [8], which
gives rise to a “two-sided incentive problem” [9]: the best
incentive to reconcile the conflicting behavior of entre-
preneur (unobservable efforts) and venture capitalist (mon-
itoring costs) is multistage financing. In an alternative ap-
proach, staged financing solves the lack of credibility and of
an adequate commitment technology on the part of the
entrepreneur.
The credibility and commitment issues arise because the
entrepreneur possesses a “unique human capital” [10]: once
the Venture Capital has provided financing, the entrepreneur
can decide to withdraw and, therefore, hold the VC hostage
of his/her decisions. In such conditions, the VC would
not provide financing, as the entrepreneur cannot make a
credible commitment not to withdraw. The solution in this
case is the “staged capital commitment” similar to Hellmann
[9] with a different rationale: the unique human capital of
the entrepreneurs must be blended with the firms in various
sequential stages. This leads to a progressive increase in the
expected value of the firm (in terms of a future initial public
offering), so that the initial investments become the collateral
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Figure 1: (a) This graph shows the global nanomedicine market size, measured in terms of revenues, such as sales revenues, grants revenues,
and milestones. From 2006 to date, a steady growth has occurred, which is expected to continue through 2014, at a CAGR of 13.5% [5].
(b) The graph illustrates the market size for the anticancer applications segment. Except for a slight decrease in 2008, the market has and is
predicted to expand by a factor of steady growth [5].
(the firm itself) for the VC, providing the right incentive to
continued financing.
The two approaches also require both the entrepreneur
and the VC to participate in the ownership of the firm (as
financing happens with shares) and therefore an evolving
strategic andmanagerial relationship between the two parties
in an evolutionary view of the firm [11]. Often the VC
possesses very good managerial skills, due to its experience
in dozens of startups, while the innovating entrepreneur has
little or none. Against this backdrop, the staged financing
with shares (i.e., joint ownership) also helps addressing the
key issue of management decisions: at the beginning of
the “relationship,” the entrepreneur has the most detailed
technical knowledge and almost completemanagerial powers
to set up all the technical work that needs to be embodied
into the firm. As this knowledge is transferred to the firm,
other managerial aspects take priority (e.g., competition,
finance, governance) where the VC has better skills. By
increasing VC ownership in stages, management powers can
be transferred to VC-appointed managers, with specific skill
in running an evolving start-up firm and take it adequately
to the market, usually with an IPO.
Due to significant concern and disapproval for fundrais-
ing in support of innovation, fledgling nanomedicine com-
panies do not have an endless number of financial options.
Therefore, in order to establish start-up companies, co-
funders generally commit their own money and expertise
into it. This is one aspect that represents the internal capital
of the startup, as opposed to the external one, which has to
be collected from other sources. At this stage start-up com-
panies turn towards government and foundations’ grants
(i.e., the National Institutes of Health, and the National
Science Foundation programs), in order to finance the re-
search and development of their innovative products. These
funds are also intended to protect the intellectual property of
these novel discoveries and to attract professional investors.
In order to expand and sustain their business,
nanomedicine startups usually begins by turning to angel
investors—private financiers who provide seed funding—
then to venture capitalists (VCs). The interaction and
support of these professional investors is essential to assess
whether a market entry is possible and to decide which
market share managers can realistically achieve at different
time horizons. In fact VCs enter at a specific moment of the
life of the company when it is still in an early stage, but has
already strongly proved its value and perspective. According
to Paul A. Gompers and Yuhai Xuan, the general role of
VCs is to alleviate asymmetric information between private
venture capital-backed targets and the public acquirers,
building a bridge between the two parts [12]. These funds
plan investment decisions in order to decrease possible
agency costs that afflict young entrepreneurial companies.
Venture capitalists usually add value to companies in
which they invest beyond pure financing, providing
managerial expertise, industrial experience, contacts and—
not least—momentum [12]. There is strong evidence
of VCs involvement in the management of the financed
nanotechnology companies as they often have higher costs
and longer development times compared to an equivalent
information technology business. Furthermore, Baker and
Gompers [13] asserted that venture capital-backed firms
have better boards of directors compared to those not
financed by VCs. This evidence confirms the crucial role
played by VCs in the economic success of nanomedicine-
based products.
Corporate finance literature has devoted a meaningful
stream of research to the relevance of board composition
as a useful tool against different typologies of asymmetric
information and agency costs. The literature has clearly
underlined the existence of a connection between firms’
performances and board composition. However, notwith-
standing these important results, there is not a universally
accepted evidence about the optimal board composition that
allows the minimization of the above-mentioned agency
costs. In the VC literature evidence, a board composed
by internal, external, and instrumental [14] should achieve
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the result of the minimization of agency costs that is
a propaedeutic step for a feasible way out for VC investors.
3.3. Landscape. In 2007 investment in nanotechnology by
VCs was US $702 million [15], involving 61 deals. 27% [15]
went to healthcare and life science, 31% [15] to energy and
environment, and 42% [15] to electronics and IT. Two years
later, nanotechnologymarket captured US $792million from
VCs [15]. Of these, the largest share (51%) [15] went to
healthcare and life sciences, followed by energy and environ-
ment and electronics and IT, with 23% and 17%, respectively
[15]. Doubling the funds invested in the healthcare segment
in just two years, the VC industry has demonstrated a clear
interest in investment opportunities in the nanomedicine
field (see Figures 2(a) and 2(b)).
Although venture capital investors want to continue to
be involved in the science and technology of the small
scale, they are extremely cautious about large investments
in nanotechnology and nanomedicine, as positive returns on
investments are expected only in the long term, especially for
nanomedicine [3]. VCs and private investors are still burned
by the subprime crisis of 2008 [16], which took a serious
toll on their assets, causing catastrophic losses to the whole
financial community and restricted access to funds. However,
the decline of fundraising might also be a result of ordinary
funding cycles, with several VCs having already raised
enough resources for the short term [17]. Experts see the
Wall Street’s crisis of 2008, as a possible regime change [16],
rather than a temporary market malfunctioning. After four
decades of fairly straightforward access to relatively inexpen-
sive capital, capital markets are currently undergoing major
changes [16]. According to the National Science Foundation,
innovation is an essential source of competitiveness for
economy [18] and represents an excellent opportunity to
sustain the economic recovery after the 2008 crisis. As usually
happen after a crisis, investors become risk adverse, adopting
more rigid risk-cover policies, but there is evidence that the
nanobusiness seems to be too attractive not to invest in.
4. Business Strategies
The main business area characterizing a nanomedicine com-
pany, as well as pharmaceutical and biotechnology indus-
tries, is the research and development (R&D). Choosing
the R&D strategy, managers evaluate two possible options.
The first is based on the idea to perform the entire process
inside the company, composing a highly experienced team
of scientists. The second option is based on universities or
research institutes and is founded on the reliance on leading
academic laboratories created over time by “scientific stars.”
This second possibility will certainly reduce company costs
as these academics frequently cofound the companies based
on their discoveries and become part of the scientific boards.
We have gathered strong evidence of this second option for
the R&D strategy in the companies we analyzed. The com-
mercialization of the research-based product might represent
another business area of the nanomedicine company. How-
ever, the typical option considered and adopted by managers
is to license out the manufacturing and commercialization
of the nanomedicine-based product to larger companies. If
this is the case, the business model pursued will not include
commercialization, and the company will be technology and
research based.
The commercialization of the nanomedicine prod-
ucts/technologies is currently driven by startups and small-
medium enterprises (SMEs) [4], and it is performed through
three types of business models.
(1) The development of a nanotechnology platform that
can be used to add value to second-party products: this busi-
ness model seems to be particularly attractive for drug
delivery companies, which typically license their particular
technologies out to pharmaceutical industries. Otherwise the
drug delivery system is tailored and applied to a specific drug
complying the particular instructions of the larger company
[4].
(2) The development and manufacturing of high-value
materials for the medical device and pharmaceutical industry:
several startups and SMEs merely provide nanomaterials for
the manufacture of medical devices or nanotechnology-en-
hanced drugs [4].
(3) The development of nanotechnology improved medical
devices or pharmaceuticals: companies adopting this business
model intend to develop a proprietary product pipeline as
well as trying to bring to the market place new or standard
drugs delivered with a drug delivery system or else to de-
velop, for example, a new diagnostic platform based on
nanotechnologies [4].
5. Regulatory Risk
The US Food and Drug Administration’s long approval
procedure and regulations make nanomedicine products
different from those of other industries using nanotech-
nologies with no limitations due to regulatory bodies. As
a consequence, the expenditure to bring a nanomedical
product to the marketplace is so huge that pharmaceutical
and biotechnology industries have no alternative but focus
on the blockbusters that can please the stockholders [3].
Nanoparticles are not inevitably hazardous, but they have
unique properties that question their safety. It is reason-
able to presume that nanomaterials are “new for safety
evaluations purposes” [3], and therefore they merit careful
regulatory oversight by FDA both before and after entering
the marketplace. In this arena, federal agencies like the FDA
and the US Patent and Trade Mark Office (PTO), impose
a sort of order, for the protection of the population safety,
while encouraging the development of these products.
The advent of nanomedicine, beside causing changes in
the biopharmaceutical industries’ business model and value
chain, brought two crucial regulatory issues: difficulties in
product classification and a lack of scientific expertise on the
part of the FDA [19].
On the basis of the product’s principal method of action,
the FDA classifies nanoproducts as drugs, devices, or combi-
nation thereof. For regulatory purposes, the FDA applies the
same requirements to each part of the combination product
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Figure 2: Venture capital investors. Captivated by the great potential of future development, in only two years VCs have shifted their focus
on the “science of the tiny things”, nearly doubling investments in this sector.
and verifies whether the manufacturer gave the correct
definition to the product. The definition becomes extremely
ambiguous novel for nano-based drug delivery devices as
they can be considered either devices (carriers) or drugs
(effectors) [19, 20]. The FDA will face exceptional chal-
lenges in efficiently regulating such products. In order to
successfully do so, a strong scientific knowledge of the field
is essential together with a better understanding of the
potential risk associated to the exposure of patients to nano-
medical products [19].
6. Best Practices in the Clinic
Bringing new products to the market has always repre-
sented a great challenge, especially when it comes to highly
innovative products with high risk/high return. Despite the
numerous entry barriers of the nanomedicine market, there
are some noteworthy examples of nano-based FDA-approved
products that successfully reached the market, impacting
medicine and anticipating a change in the healthcare arena.
Within the anticancer products segment, Doxil and
Abraxane are two main examples of success in the clinic.
Sequus Pharmaceuticals was the first company to sell doxil,
the liposomal formulation of Doxorubicin, a powerful but
toxic chemotherapeutic, initially approved for treatment of
Kaposi’s sarcoma in the USA in 1995 [21]. Sequus was
then acquired in 1998 by ALZA Pharmaceutical for US
$580 millions [22], which subsequently merged with John-
son and Johnson in 2001 in a US $12.3 billion deal
[22]. The other approved nanotherapeutic agent, Abraxane,
instead, was originally sold by Abraxis Biosciences, which
was acquired in June 2010 by Celgene Corporation for US
$2.9 billions [23]. Granted by the orphan drug designation
in January 2005 by the FDA, this product consists of albumin
nanoparticles containing paclitaxel, and is indicated for the
treatment of breast cancer [21]. Conventional chemother-
apies consist of injections of cytotoxic drug intravenously,
which indiscriminately kill both healthy and tumor cells. The
clinic success of Doxil and Abraxane was driven by their
ability to concentrate preferentially in tumors, because of
the gaps (otherwise called endothelial fenestrations) charac-
terizing the blood vessels that supply the cancerous mass.
Nanoparticles of the right size can penetrate these “gates”
and passively diffuse into the tumors [24]. Thanks to this
generation of chemotherapies, patients are now benefiting
from new treatment strategies for delivering drugs through
nanotechnology carriers with lower systemic toxicity and
improved therapeutic efficacy [21].
The economic success of these nanomedical products is
driven by an urgent demand of new anticancer therapies able
to better fight this highly aggressive and increasingly frequent
disease. In fact, the FDA problematic regulatory process, the
unsteady funding situation, and the expensive and lengthy
R&D process did not thwart the development and success of
Doxil and Abraxane.
Despite being the most profitable, anticancer delivery
systems are not the only clinically approved nanomedical
products. In fact, advances in nanomedicine are bringing
breakthroughs in other problematic areas of medicine.
Following are some examples of successful nano-enabled
biomedical products currently on the market.
The first successful application of nanoparticles in the
clinic was Omniscan, the leading injectable paramagnetic
resonance product of Amersham. This contrast agent was
approved for magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), launched
in 1993, and utilized ever since both in neurology, to
detect strokes and brain tumors, as well as in cardiology.
This contrast agent—originally developed by Salutar—has
prolonged half-life in patients with renal insufficiency. After
the conduction of preclinical testing, Salutar was acquired
by Nycomed, which in turn purchased Amersham Inter-
national, in 1997. Currently, Amersham and its rights on
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Omniscan are propriety of General Electric Healthcare. The
deal was closed in 2003 for US $9.5 billion on an all-stock
transaction. According to Yan et al. [25] and as confirmed
by Spiess [26], there are 12 different MRI contrast agents
currently on the market [27]. Magnevist was marketed by
Bayer Schering Pharma as their first intravenous contrast
agent employed in the clinic. In 2004, the company demon-
strated that the product safely and effectively eases the
visualization of cranial and vertebral anatomy among cancers
and wounds, and since then it is diffused worldwide with that
specification of use [28]. Another competitor is OptiMARK,
a gadolinium-based contrast agent (the only FDA-approved
for administration by power injection) for MRI of brain,
liver, and spine [29] produced by Mallinckrodt; it allows
the visualization of lesions with atypical vascularity. Finally,
MultiHance is the first extracellular fluid contrast agent
to pose interaction with plasma proteins. Bracco Group pro-
duces this contrast agent—an Italian company specialized in
diagnostic imaging, drugs and devices—and is utilized in
diagnostic MRI of the liver and central nervous system
(CNS). It was launched in Europe in 1998 and received the
FDA approval for market the product in the United States in
2004 [30].
Returning to the segment of the pharmaceutical applica-
tions of nanomedicine, it is important to remember the two
FDA-approved nanoparticles-based drugs applied for the
treatment of severe fungal infections: AmBisome (liposome
for injection), sold by Gilead Sciences and Fujisawa Health-
care and Abelcet (lipid complex), marketed by Elan Corpora-
tion. Liposomal formulation of amphotericin B (AmBisome,
in its trade name) was originally one of the income-making
drugs of NeXstar Pharmaceuticals. The company, along with
its products portfolio, was then acquired by Gilead in March
1999. For what concerns Abelcet (the conventional ampho-
tericin B), its North America rights were acquired by Enzon
Pharmaceuticals in 2002, in an operational and profitable
deal of $360 million (including facilities and operating assets
related to the development, production, and sale of the
drug). The drug was employed in the treatment of patients
with aggressive fungal infection associated to cancer, organs’
transplantation, and other postsurgical complications [31].
We wanted to emphasize these two specific products also
because they have been subject of a “pharmacoeconomic
study.” As a result of the analysis, that involved the two drugs
in the empirical treatment of persistently febrile neutropenic
patients with presumed fungal infection, AmBisome was
found to be more cost-effective compared to Abelcet [32].
RenaZorb sold by Spectrum Pharmaceuticals represents
another case of a nano-enabled product, which fruitfully
reached the marketplace for the treatment of hyperphos-
phatemia in end-stage renal disease (ESRD) and potentially
chronic kidney disease (CKD). RenaZorb is a lanthanum-
based phosphate-binding agent currently in clinical trial,
utilizing Spectrum’s proprietary nanoparticle technology
[33]. The economic and clinical success of this nanoparticle
is mainly driven by the clinical scenario. According to the
National Kidney Foundation, only in the US are estimated
to be more than 20 million people with CKD with numbers
expected to double over the next decade. These patients live
on kidney dialysis and are potential candidates for phosphate
binder therapy [34].
In the light of all this overview of the best practices in
the clinic, anticancer remains the biggest share of the
nanomedicine market, besides for number of publications
and patents, also for number of commercialized products.
Increasing acceptance with the general public of the employ-
ment of nanotechnologies in the clinic, along with popular
widespread sensitivity for the aggressiveness of cancer, can be
considered strong drivers for the commercial success of this
segment. Furthermore, the first tangible considerable returns
due to commercial triumphs represent an undoubted source
of attraction for investors. On their part, financiers must
realize the importance of providing the substantive funds,
necessary to gain the solid results and successful drugs as well
as devices and therapies the market requires. The effective
investments on Doxil and Abraxane, as well as on the other
mentioned successful products, are prime examples of this
practice.
7. Conclusions and Future Promises
Despite the issues nanomedicine still has to face, investments
in this market are predicted to increase. New applications
of nanomedicine have been demonstrated, and the resulting
expansion of the potential market makes the risk more
appealing. Ferocious financial collapse elevated sunk costs
of the essential R&D process, tricky access to funds, uncer-
tainty of expected returns, and the extremely meticulous,
and lengthy FDA regulatory process has not deterred the
investors’ community. On the other hand, the promises of
great future potential developments in the different market
segments and high returns connected to the high risk of the
innovation investments make this market still considerably
attractive. Compared to the 2007 benchmark, VCs in 2009
decided to double their investments in this sector, at the
expenses of the information technology market. The fact that
nanomedicine dominates the VC funding in the healthcare
market is surely a good predictor of the bright future
landscape of expansion of this promising area of research.
Moreover, good returns could even be the result of
more accurate assessments of the investments’ risks. A
pharmacoeconomic analysis would allow the efficient allo-
cation of the monetary resources and the maximization of
the highest health return at the lowest costs. A cost-
effectiveness analysis (CEA) is structured with a comparison
of the costs and effects of two or more treatments, which
are under examination. Whereas in the very early stage of
the drug development cycle the high failure rate for novel
drug molecules is largely due to a not adequate therapeutic
index, in the clinical development phase, this rate originates
from economic reasons. Therefore, the development of
unsuccessful drugs has to be abandoned very fast, in order to
save resources for more promising compounds. This saving
is obtained through an accurate economic evaluation per-
formed in the early stages of the development process. The
benchmark is represented by life-years saved by the investi-
gated nanotherapeutic; if a nano-enabled therapy does not
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save sufficient life-years to break-even, it should not be
developed further [35].
The major limit to the success of this kind of anal-
ysis is given by the scarcity of clinical data concerning
nanomedicine. The best solution to this issue is collabora-
tion. According to Bosetti and Vereeck [35], economists and
investors specialized in health market should work closely
with healthcare providers, researchers, patients associations,
doctors, and technologists of all kinds, to create a shared
platform able to facilitate communication between parties
with the ultimate aim to reduce the high risks associated
to investments in nanomedicine. As a result, also patients
will benefit from these investments, in terms of innovative
techniques, therapies, devices, and drugs designed to extend
and improve their lives.
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